On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:

> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
> is empirical ...

What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
“analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
experience)?

On 04/27/2024 01:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>
>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
>> is empirical ...
>
> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
> experience)?
>

You know that's a very usual question about the "essence or existence"
of these objects of the "noumena or phenomena".

I heartily encourage you to consult such masters of the canon of
the dogma and doctrine of philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology,
the semiotics, and logicism and positivism, in the exploration
of the consideration of idealism and nominalism.

A most usual notion is that individuals are objective and their
own objects, establishing among them or each other, the
intersubjectivity, as with regards to interobjectivity, as you raise the
point of the object/subject distinction, in reference, and perspective.

Warm regards and good luck in your philosophical studies, into
the theories of the universe of objects logical and mathematical
and the natural sciences.

You know that's a very usual question and it's thoroughly
explored since antiquity in the dogma and doctrine of
the fundamentals of the theories of logic and mathematics,
and, philosophy, the nature of being, and truth, over time.

I address some such things in my podcasts which are of the
spoken word audio sort.

Warm regards and good luck in your endeavors.

--
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson

On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>
>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
>> is empirical ...
>
> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
> experience)?

I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.

My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
the nature of meaning expressed using language.

Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.

This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality

This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory

All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
axioms of a formal system.

Natural language expressions are formalized using
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/

Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
Facts of the world.

The details of current situations that are not general
facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
to {true on the basis of meaning}.

∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
x)))

The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.

Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
"This sentence is not true"
and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.

People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
summation of the philosophical issues involved.

We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>
>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
>>> is empirical ...
>>
>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>> experience)?
>
> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>
> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>
> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>
> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>
> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>
> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
> axioms of a formal system.
>
> Natural language expressions are formalized using
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>
> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
> Facts of the world.
>
> The details of current situations that are not general
> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
> x)))
>
> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>
> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
> "This sentence is not true"
> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>
> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>
> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>

I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.

Of course type theory is great and natural language
has meaning, they're often associated with great
and extensive developments in such notions,
like Tesniere and Peirce.

So, you can lie together, yet,
that's not truth once discovered.

That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
for example how proof theory models proof theory and
model theory proves model theory,
and it's natural language in words and according to types,
is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.

Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
in the strings in my database".

That's called living in a box,
I see it a lot these days.

I'm a big fan of Tesniere.

Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.

The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.

It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".

Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.

Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
of Russell, also.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan

See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.

On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>
>>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
>>>> experience
>>>> is empirical ...
>>>
>>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>>> experience)?
>>
>> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
>> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
>> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>>
>> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
>> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>>
>> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
>> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>>
>> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>
>> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>>
>> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
>> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
>> axioms of a formal system.
>>
>> Natural language expressions are formalized using
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>>
>> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
>> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
>> Facts of the world.
>>
>> The details of current situations that are not general
>> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
>> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
>> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x)  ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
>> x)))
>>
>> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
>> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
>> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>>
>> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
>> "This sentence is not true"
>> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
>> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
>> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>>
>> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
>> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
>> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
>> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
>> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>>
>> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
>> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
>> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>>
>
> I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
> a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
>

In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
attack is valid inference.

> Of course type theory is great and natural language
> has meaning, they're often associated with great
> and extensive developments in such notions,
> like Tesniere and Peirce.
>
> So, you can lie together, yet,
> that's not truth once discovered.
>
> That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
> for example how proof theory models proof theory and
> model theory proves model theory,
> and it's natural language in words and according to types,
> is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
>
> Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
> in the strings in my database".
>
> That's called living in a box,
> I see it a lot these days.
>
>
> I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
>
>
> Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
> about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
>
>
> The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
>
>
> It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
> results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
> and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
>
>
> Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
> comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
>
> Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
> of Russell, also.
>
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
>
> See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
> on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
> the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
> and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
> to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
> and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
> Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
> foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
> of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
> is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
> not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
> regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
> mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
> and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
> technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
>
>
>
>
>

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 04/27/2024 11:24 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
>>>>> experience
>>>>> is empirical ...
>>>>
>>>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>>>> experience)?
>>>
>>> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
>>> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
>>> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>>>
>>> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
>>> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>>>
>>> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
>>> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>>>
>>> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>
>>> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>>>
>>> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
>>> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
>>> axioms of a formal system.
>>>
>>> Natural language expressions are formalized using
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>>>
>>> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
>>> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
>>> Facts of the world.
>>>
>>> The details of current situations that are not general
>>> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
>>> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
>>> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
>>> x)))
>>>
>>> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
>>> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
>>> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>>>
>>> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
>>> "This sentence is not true"
>>> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
>>> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
>>> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>>>
>>> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
>>> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
>>> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
>>> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
>>> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>>>
>>> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
>>> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
>>> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>>>
>>
>> I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
>> a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
>>
>
> In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
> attack is valid inference.
>
>> Of course type theory is great and natural language
>> has meaning, they're often associated with great
>> and extensive developments in such notions,
>> like Tesniere and Peirce.
>>
>> So, you can lie together, yet,
>> that's not truth once discovered.
>>
>> That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
>> for example how proof theory models proof theory and
>> model theory proves model theory,
>> and it's natural language in words and according to types,
>> is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
>>
>> Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
>> in the strings in my database".
>>
>> That's called living in a box,
>> I see it a lot these days.
>>
>>
>> I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
>>
>>
>> Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
>> about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
>>
>>
>> The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
>>
>>
>> It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
>> results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
>> and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
>>
>>
>> Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
>> comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
>>
>> Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
>> of Russell, also.
>>
>>
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
>>
>> See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
>> on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
>> the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
>> and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
>> to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
>> and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
>> Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
>> foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
>> of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
>> is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
>> not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
>> regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
>> mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
>> and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
>> technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

No, that's rhetoric.

"When you set out to kill a man,
dig two graves.
One for him and one for you."

Confucius, "my name is Confucius,
it means master teacher".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confucius

"Like most sayings attributed to Confucius in the Anglosphere, it’s
unlikely to have actually originated with him. It appears to have come
to us from Japan, as “Hito o norowaba ana futatsu” (if you curse
someone, [dig] two holes.”

Notably, the Chinese Wiktionary entry for the Japanese phrase gives only
a translation, with the closest Chinese equivalent given being 害人害己
(hài rén hài jî; hurt another, hurt yourself). This appears to come from
a collection of unattributed proverbs."

- https://www.econlib.org/he-who-seeks-revenge-digs-two-graves/

That Montague and Russell are flakes and insincere hypocrites is technical.

On 4/27/2024 1:35 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/27/2024 11:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
>>>>>> experience
>>>>>> is empirical ...
>>>>>
>>>>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>>>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>>>>> experience)?
>>>>
>>>> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
>>>> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
>>>> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>>>>
>>>> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
>>>> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>>>>
>>>> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
>>>> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>>>>
>>>> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>>
>>>> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>>>>
>>>> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
>>>> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
>>>> axioms of a formal system.
>>>>
>>>> Natural language expressions are formalized using
>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>>>>
>>>> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
>>>> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
>>>> Facts of the world.
>>>>
>>>> The details of current situations that are not general
>>>> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
>>>> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
>>>> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x)  ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨
>>>> False(L,
>>>> x)))
>>>>
>>>> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
>>>> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
>>>> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>>>>
>>>> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
>>>> "This sentence is not true"
>>>> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
>>>> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
>>>> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>>>>
>>>> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
>>>> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
>>>> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
>>>> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
>>>> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>>>>
>>>> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
>>>> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
>>>> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
>>> a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
>>>
>>
>> In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
>> attack is valid inference.
>>
>>> Of course type theory is great and natural language
>>> has meaning, they're often associated with great
>>> and extensive developments in such notions,
>>> like Tesniere and Peirce.
>>>
>>> So, you can lie together, yet,
>>> that's not truth once discovered.
>>>
>>> That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
>>> for example how proof theory models proof theory and
>>> model theory proves model theory,
>>> and it's natural language in words and according to types,
>>> is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
>>>
>>> Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
>>> in the strings in my database".
>>>
>>> That's called living in a box,
>>> I see it a lot these days.
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
>>>
>>>
>>> Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
>>> about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
>>>
>>>
>>> The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
>>>
>>>
>>> It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
>>> results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
>>> and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
>>>
>>>
>>> Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
>>> comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
>>>
>>> Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
>>> of Russell, also.
>>>
>>>
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
>>>
>>> See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
>>> on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
>>> the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
>>> and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
>>> to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
>>> and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
>>> Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
>>> foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
>>> of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
>>> is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
>>> not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
>>> regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
>>> mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
>>> and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
>>> technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> No, that's rhetoric.
>

It seems to indicate a strong bias away from an honest
dialogue that is fully anchored in reasoning and nothing else.

There really is such a thing as {true on the basis of meaning}
It seems that we must stick to achieving mutual agreement
on this single point before moving on to any other points.

I can't tolerate discussing logic on the basis of emotional
reactions.

>
> That Montague and Russell are flakes and insincere hypocrites is technical.
>

Not in the least little bit it is converting an honest dialogue about
{true on the basis of meaning} into an emotional reaction utterly bereft
of reasoning.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer