On Monday, 18 April 2022 at 16:58:17 UTC+10, David P. wrote:
> Is Shanghai’s Covid-19 Disaster China’s Future?
> By Nathaniel Taplin, April 13, 2022, WSJ
>
> After largely keeping out Covid-19 for two years, China’s
> largest city is battling an outbreak numbering over 100,000
> cases. And while the Shanghai government has yet to acknowledge
> any Covid fatalities, spiking deaths at some elderly care
> facilities suggest that the numbers are there, whether
> officially acknowledged or not.
>
> Is this a sign of things to come in the rest of China?
>
> Not necessarily, but if the government doesn’t move quickly
> to vaccinate and boost its elderly, and start spending much
> more heavily on hospital capacity, then the human and economic
> consequences could be disastrous.
>
> Events in Hong Kong and Shanghai have demonstrated that a
> “zero Covid” strategy can look very effective for a long time—
> until suddenly it isn’t, either because a more infectious variant
> changes the game or because success itself breeds overconfidence.
>
> To be sure, mainland China has tools that Hong Kong lacks. These
> include the network of neighborhood party committees that have
> formed the backbone of grass-roots monitoring and enforcement,
> the state’s greater coercive and surveillance capabilities writ
> large, and the ability to mobilize enormous manpower in a pinch
> to build hospital space, conduct testing, or deliver food. The
> political stakes on the mainland, where Communist Party General
> Secretary Xi Jinping is poised to bid for an unprecedented third
> term later this year, are also arguably even higher than in Hong Kong.
>
> Shanghai’s struggle to deliver food to residents and staff
> medical facilities shows that these advantages can crumble quickly,
> however, if Omicron’s exponential growth isn’t halted in its early
> stages. At the very least China will pay an enormous economic price
> to bring the current outbreak under control. Cities under complete
> lockdown or very harsh control measures as of early April accounted
> for about 13% of China’s economy, according to Gavekal Dragonomics.
> China’s target of “around 5.5%” growth for 2022—which looked ambitious
> before the recent outbreak—now looks implausible.
>
> More important, even assuming this outbreak is controlled, the
> idea that China can achieve a “soft exit” from “zero Covid” at
> some future date without large-scale fatalities is seeming
> increasingly questionable.
>
> China invested heavily in healthcare for the past several years—
> to the tune of 30% growth in 2020 and 25% last year, both far
> faster than overall fixed asset investment, which only grew in
> the single digits both years. But in some important respects,
> that rapid investment is coming from a very low base. China had
> only 4.4 intensive care beds per 100,000 residents in 2021,
> according to Morgan Stanley—compared with around 11 in South
> Korea and the U.K., and 26 in the U.S.
>
> Mainland China also has some of the same weaknesses that led to
> Hong Kong’s disastrous Omicron outbreak. As in Hong Kong, and for
> reasons that aren’t entirely clear, a large proportion of the
> elderly remain unvaccinated or only partially vaccinated—about
> half of the population over 80.
>
> In Hong Kong, where government health expenditures are slightly
> higher than China’s as a percentage of gross domestic product,
> hospitals were easily overwhelmed by large numbers of elderly
> patients once Omicron broke through. Hong Kong also has 7.1 ICU
> beds per 100,000 residents, according to a February article in
> the Hong Kong Medical Journal—significantly more on a per capita
> basis than China. General government expenditure on healthcare
> in China amounted to less than 3% of GDP in 2019, according to
> the World Bank, below the upper-middle-income average of 3.3%
> and well below the nearly 8% typical of developed countries.
>
> China has also declined to approve foreign mRNA-based Covid-19
> vaccines, such as those developed by Pfizer and Moderna that
> appear to offer superior protection against the virus compared
> with vaccines developed using older technologies—including China’s
> own. The rationale has apparently been to create room for Chinese
> businesses to develop their own mRNA vaccines, a venture that could
> eventually be successful. By buying time for China’s domestic
> vaccine entrepreneurs, however, Beijing may have squandered time
> to get its most vulnerable vaccinated with the best protection available.
>
> For now, China’s outbreak appears to have only reached truly
> dangerous levels in Shanghai and the northern province of Jilin.
> But the days of “zero Covid”—so successful at preventing deaths
> and economic damage early in the pandemic—are now clearly numbered.
> Omicron is too contagious and the economic cost of containing it is
> unsustainable. If the Chinese government doesn’t use its remaining
> time to aggressively vaccinate and boost its vulnerable with the
> best protection available, build up intensive-care capacity, and
> motivate the populace to protect itself by articulating a clear
> intention to eventually move toward living with the virus, many
> more situations like Shanghai and Hong Kong might become inevitable.
>
> https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-shanghais-covid-disaster-chinas-future-11649867483

Lockdown was a very good decision in early 2020, when the virus was unknown and vaccine unavailable.
Unfortunately, the virus (new variants) are now very infectious, and lockdowns are very expensive. China should open up and rely on vaccines, like the rest of the world !!!

On Monday, April 18, 2022 at 6:36:10 AM UTC-4, mccoy...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Monday, 18 April 2022 at 16:58:17 UTC+10, David P. wrote:
> > Is Shanghai’s Covid-19 Disaster China’s Future?
> > By Nathaniel Taplin, April 13, 2022, WSJ
> >
> > After largely keeping out Covid-19 for two years, China’s
> > largest city is battling an outbreak numbering over 100,000
> > cases. And while the Shanghai government has yet to acknowledge
> > any Covid fatalities, spiking deaths at some elderly care
> > facilities suggest that the numbers are there, whether
> > officially acknowledged or not.
> >
> > Is this a sign of things to come in the rest of China?
> >
> > Not necessarily, but if the government doesn’t move quickly
> > to vaccinate and boost its elderly, and start spending much
> > more heavily on hospital capacity, then the human and economic
> > consequences could be disastrous.
> >
> > Events in Hong Kong and Shanghai have demonstrated that a
> > “zero Covid” strategy can look very effective for a long time—
> > until suddenly it isn’t, either because a more infectious variant
> > changes the game or because success itself breeds overconfidence.
> >
> > To be sure, mainland China has tools that Hong Kong lacks. These
> > include the network of neighborhood party committees that have
> > formed the backbone of grass-roots monitoring and enforcement,
> > the state’s greater coercive and surveillance capabilities writ
> > large, and the ability to mobilize enormous manpower in a pinch
> > to build hospital space, conduct testing, or deliver food. The
> > political stakes on the mainland, where Communist Party General
> > Secretary Xi Jinping is poised to bid for an unprecedented third
> > term later this year, are also arguably even higher than in Hong Kong.
> >
> > Shanghai’s struggle to deliver food to residents and staff
> > medical facilities shows that these advantages can crumble quickly,
> > however, if Omicron’s exponential growth isn’t halted in its early
> > stages. At the very least China will pay an enormous economic price
> > to bring the current outbreak under control. Cities under complete
> > lockdown or very harsh control measures as of early April accounted
> > for about 13% of China’s economy, according to Gavekal Dragonomics.
> > China’s target of “around 5.5%” growth for 2022—which looked ambitious
> > before the recent outbreak—now looks implausible.
> >
> > More important, even assuming this outbreak is controlled, the
> > idea that China can achieve a “soft exit” from “zero Covid” at
> > some future date without large-scale fatalities is seeming
> > increasingly questionable.
> >
> > China invested heavily in healthcare for the past several years—
> > to the tune of 30% growth in 2020 and 25% last year, both far
> > faster than overall fixed asset investment, which only grew in
> > the single digits both years. But in some important respects,
> > that rapid investment is coming from a very low base. China had
> > only 4.4 intensive care beds per 100,000 residents in 2021,
> > according to Morgan Stanley—compared with around 11 in South
> > Korea and the U.K., and 26 in the U.S.
> >
> > Mainland China also has some of the same weaknesses that led to
> > Hong Kong’s disastrous Omicron outbreak. As in Hong Kong, and for
> > reasons that aren’t entirely clear, a large proportion of the
> > elderly remain unvaccinated or only partially vaccinated—about
> > half of the population over 80.
> >
> > In Hong Kong, where government health expenditures are slightly
> > higher than China’s as a percentage of gross domestic product,
> > hospitals were easily overwhelmed by large numbers of elderly
> > patients once Omicron broke through. Hong Kong also has 7.1 ICU
> > beds per 100,000 residents, according to a February article in
> > the Hong Kong Medical Journal—significantly more on a per capita
> > basis than China. General government expenditure on healthcare
> > in China amounted to less than 3% of GDP in 2019, according to
> > the World Bank, below the upper-middle-income average of 3.3%
> > and well below the nearly 8% typical of developed countries.
> >
> > China has also declined to approve foreign mRNA-based Covid-19
> > vaccines, such as those developed by Pfizer and Moderna that
> > appear to offer superior protection against the virus compared
> > with vaccines developed using older technologies—including China’s
> > own. The rationale has apparently been to create room for Chinese
> > businesses to develop their own mRNA vaccines, a venture that could
> > eventually be successful. By buying time for China’s domestic
> > vaccine entrepreneurs, however, Beijing may have squandered time
> > to get its most vulnerable vaccinated with the best protection available.
> >
> > For now, China’s outbreak appears to have only reached truly
> > dangerous levels in Shanghai and the northern province of Jilin.
> > But the days of “zero Covid”—so successful at preventing deaths
> > and economic damage early in the pandemic—are now clearly numbered.
> > Omicron is too contagious and the economic cost of containing it is
> > unsustainable. If the Chinese government doesn’t use its remaining
> > time to aggressively vaccinate and boost its vulnerable with the
> > best protection available, build up intensive-care capacity, and
> > motivate the populace to protect itself by articulating a clear
> > intention to eventually move toward living with the virus, many
> > more situations like Shanghai and Hong Kong might become inevitable.
> >
> > https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-shanghais-covid-disaster-chinas-future-11649867483
> Lockdown was a very good decision in early 2020, when the virus was unknown and vaccine unavailable.
> Unfortunately, the virus (new variants) are now very infectious, and lockdowns are very expensive. China should open up and rely on vaccines, like the rest of the world !!!

Two years is hardly seconds if viewed from the long history of virus. The virus may have more tricks to get into the human body to do harm. Long covid appears to be
less age discriminatory and a small number of these patients can put a lot of pressure on the health care system.
Anyway, lock down in China2022 is different from lock down in China 2020 because of past experience, accumulated medical expertise and vaccine availability .

On Monday, April 18, 2022 at 9:41:48 AM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
> On Monday, April 18, 2022 at 6:36:10 AM UTC-4, mccoy...@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Monday, 18 April 2022 at 16:58:17 UTC+10, David P. wrote:
> > > Is Shanghai’s Covid-19 Disaster China’s Future?
> > > By Nathaniel Taplin, April 13, 2022, WSJ
> > >
> > > After largely keeping out Covid-19 for two years, China’s
> > > largest city is battling an outbreak numbering over 100,000
> > > cases. And while the Shanghai government has yet to acknowledge
> > > any Covid fatalities, spiking deaths at some elderly care
> > > facilities suggest that the numbers are there, whether
> > > officially acknowledged or not.
> > >
> > > Is this a sign of things to come in the rest of China?
> > >
> > > Not necessarily, but if the government doesn’t move quickly
> > > to vaccinate and boost its elderly, and start spending much
> > > more heavily on hospital capacity, then the human and economic
> > > consequences could be disastrous.
> > >
> > > Events in Hong Kong and Shanghai have demonstrated that a
> > > “zero Covid” strategy can look very effective for a long time—
> > > until suddenly it isn’t, either because a more infectious variant
> > > changes the game or because success itself breeds overconfidence.
> > >
> > > To be sure, mainland China has tools that Hong Kong lacks. These
> > > include the network of neighborhood party committees that have
> > > formed the backbone of grass-roots monitoring and enforcement,
> > > the state’s greater coercive and surveillance capabilities writ
> > > large, and the ability to mobilize enormous manpower in a pinch
> > > to build hospital space, conduct testing, or deliver food. The
> > > political stakes on the mainland, where Communist Party General
> > > Secretary Xi Jinping is poised to bid for an unprecedented third
> > > term later this year, are also arguably even higher than in Hong Kong..
> > >
> > > Shanghai’s struggle to deliver food to residents and staff
> > > medical facilities shows that these advantages can crumble quickly,
> > > however, if Omicron’s exponential growth isn’t halted in its early
> > > stages. At the very least China will pay an enormous economic price
> > > to bring the current outbreak under control. Cities under complete
> > > lockdown or very harsh control measures as of early April accounted
> > > for about 13% of China’s economy, according to Gavekal Dragonomics.
> > > China’s target of “around 5.5%” growth for 2022—which looked ambitious
> > > before the recent outbreak—now looks implausible.
> > >
> > > More important, even assuming this outbreak is controlled, the
> > > idea that China can achieve a “soft exit” from “zero Covid” at
> > > some future date without large-scale fatalities is seeming
> > > increasingly questionable.
> > >
> > > China invested heavily in healthcare for the past several years—
> > > to the tune of 30% growth in 2020 and 25% last year, both far
> > > faster than overall fixed asset investment, which only grew in
> > > the single digits both years. But in some important respects,
> > > that rapid investment is coming from a very low base. China had
> > > only 4.4 intensive care beds per 100,000 residents in 2021,
> > > according to Morgan Stanley—compared with around 11 in South
> > > Korea and the U.K., and 26 in the U.S.
> > >
> > > Mainland China also has some of the same weaknesses that led to
> > > Hong Kong’s disastrous Omicron outbreak. As in Hong Kong, and for
> > > reasons that aren’t entirely clear, a large proportion of the
> > > elderly remain unvaccinated or only partially vaccinated—about
> > > half of the population over 80.
> > >
> > > In Hong Kong, where government health expenditures are slightly
> > > higher than China’s as a percentage of gross domestic product,
> > > hospitals were easily overwhelmed by large numbers of elderly
> > > patients once Omicron broke through. Hong Kong also has 7.1 ICU
> > > beds per 100,000 residents, according to a February article in
> > > the Hong Kong Medical Journal—significantly more on a per capita
> > > basis than China. General government expenditure on healthcare
> > > in China amounted to less than 3% of GDP in 2019, according to
> > > the World Bank, below the upper-middle-income average of 3.3%
> > > and well below the nearly 8% typical of developed countries.
> > >
> > > China has also declined to approve foreign mRNA-based Covid-19
> > > vaccines, such as those developed by Pfizer and Moderna that
> > > appear to offer superior protection against the virus compared
> > > with vaccines developed using older technologies—including China’s
> > > own. The rationale has apparently been to create room for Chinese
> > > businesses to develop their own mRNA vaccines, a venture that could
> > > eventually be successful. By buying time for China’s domestic
> > > vaccine entrepreneurs, however, Beijing may have squandered time
> > > to get its most vulnerable vaccinated with the best protection available.
> > >
> > > For now, China’s outbreak appears to have only reached truly
> > > dangerous levels in Shanghai and the northern province of Jilin.
> > > But the days of “zero Covid”—so successful at preventing deaths
> > > and economic damage early in the pandemic—are now clearly numbered.
> > > Omicron is too contagious and the economic cost of containing it is
> > > unsustainable. If the Chinese government doesn’t use its remaining
> > > time to aggressively vaccinate and boost its vulnerable with the
> > > best protection available, build up intensive-care capacity, and
> > > motivate the populace to protect itself by articulating a clear
> > > intention to eventually move toward living with the virus, many
> > > more situations like Shanghai and Hong Kong might become inevitable.
> > >
> > > https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-shanghais-covid-disaster-chinas-future-11649867483
> > Lockdown was a very good decision in early 2020, when the virus was unknown and vaccine unavailable.
> > Unfortunately, the virus (new variants) are now very infectious, and lockdowns are very expensive. China should open up and rely on vaccines, like the rest of the world !!!
> Two years is hardly seconds if viewed from the long history of virus. The virus may have more tricks to get into the human body to do harm. Long covid appears to be
> less age discriminatory and a small number of these patients can put a lot of pressure on the health care system.

At present, the covid virus is a lot less lethal. But long coivd could cause a lot of pain, suffering, and hopelessness.
"Two years, three bouts of covid and 11 doctors later, no one seems to know why Lindsay Polega is still so ill.
She’s only 28 years old and was the picture of health before her infections. Polega, who graduated from law
school last year, is now suffering from chest pain, hypertensive spikes, hand numbness and numerous other
symptoms.
Her life has become a series of doctor’s appointments crisscrossing the towns around her home in St.
Petersburg, Fla.: Her primary-care physician sent her to an immunologist. The immunologist referred her to
a cardiologist. The cardiologist sent her to a nephrologist and an endocrinologist. The endocrinologist
thought she might learn more from a neurologist. But when the neurologist’s tests failed to find any
potential cause, Polega was sent back to the immunologist. ...
“I wonder, ‘Is this going to be the rest of my life?’” Polega said. “I can’t live in my room forever. That’s not
a good answer. That’s not treatment.” ...
As the world enters its third year with the coronavirus, more than 425 million people have been infected,
and researchers estimate that anywhere from 10 to 30 percent could experience symptoms of long covid
months after recovering from their initial illness."

https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/18/long-covid-medical-care-challenge/

> Anyway, lock down in China2022 is different from lock down in China 2020 because of past experience, accumulated medical expertise and vaccine availability .