On 17 Apr 2023, Lou Bricano <lou.bricano@gmail.com> posted some
news:3f0f9b38-1ca5-46d1-ad0c-fc132db80515n@googlegroups.com:

> He's wrong. The cops cannot demand to see ID...or, they can try, but
> you don't have to show any. Why don't you have to show any? Because
> you're not required to carry any. When the cops demand to see a
> driver license when they pull you over for a traffic stop, they aren't
> looking for ID. They're demanding to see that you are legally
> authorized to operate a motor vehicle on public streets. If you think
> I'm wrong — you'd be stupid to think that, of course — then the
> next time a cop pulls you over for a traffic violation, try showing
> him your passport or your voter ID or some other state-issued form of
> ID that isn't a driver license, and see what happens.
>
> scooter is full of shit. scooter will always be full of shit.

Rudy, you're wrong as usual #71825.

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 03�5554

LARRY D. HIIBEL, PETITIONER v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA,
HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
[June 21, 2004]

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to identify himself
during a stop allowed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). He challenges
his conviction under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

The sheriff�s department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon
telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man
assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy
Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived
at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was
standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The
officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him
to believe it had come to a sudden stop.

The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a
report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked
him if he had �any identification on [him],� which we understand as a
request to produce a driver�s license or some other form of written
identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see
identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an
investigation and needed to see some identification. The unidentified man
became agitated and insisted he had done nothing wrong. The officer
explained that he wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing
there. After continued refusals to comply with the officer�s request for
identification, the man began to taunt the officer by placing his hands
behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to
jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: the officer asked for
identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning the man
that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer
placed him under arrest.

We now know that the man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley
Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with �willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or
obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge
any legal duty of his office� in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS)
�199.280 (2003). The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the
officer in carrying out his duties under �171.123, a Nevada statute that
defines the legal rights and duties of a police officer in the context of
an investigative stop. Section 171.123 provides in relevant part:

�1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters
under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has
committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.

.. . . . .

�3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to
ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his
presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may
not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.�

Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township. The court agreed
that Hiibel�s refusal to identify himself as required by �171.123
�obstructed and delayed Dove as a public officer in attempting to
discharge his duty� in violation of �199.280. App. 5. Hiibel was convicted
and fined $250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed, rejecting
Hiibel�s argument that the application of �171.123 to his case violated
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada
rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge in a divided opinion. 118 Nev.
868, 59 P.3d 1201 (2002). Hiibel petitioned for rehearing, seeking
explicit resolution of his Fifth Amendment challenge. The petition was
denied without opinion. We granted certiorari. 540 U.S. 965 (2003).

II

NRS �171.123(3) is an enactment sometimes referred to as a �stop and
identify� statute. See Ala. Code �15�5�30 (West 2003); Ark. Code Ann.
�5�71�213(a)(1) (2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. �16�3�103(1) (2003); Del. Code
Ann., Tit. 11, ��1902(a), 1321(6) (2003); Fla. Stat. �856.021(2) (2003);
Ga. Code Ann. �16�11�36(b) (2003); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, �5/107�14
(2004); Kan. Stat. Ann. �22�2402(1) (2003); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.,
Art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. �84.710(2) (2003); Mont. Code
Ann. �46�5�401(2)(a) (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. �29�829 (2003); N. H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. ��594:2 and 644:6 (Lexis 2003); N. M. Stat. Ann. �30�22�3
(2004); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law �140.50(1) (West 2004); N. D. Cent. Code
�29�29�21 (2003); R. I. Gen. Laws �12�7�1 (2003); Utah Code Ann. �77�7�15
(2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, �1983 (Supp. 2003); Wis. Stat. �968.24
(2003). See also Note, Stop and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an
Inadequate Solution to an Old Problem, 12 Rutgers L. J. 585 (1981); Note,
Stop-and-Identify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1057 (1984).

Stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy
laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of
investigatory stops. The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit
an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. A few
States model their statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act, a model code that
permits an officer to stop a person reasonably suspected of committing a
crime and �demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he
is going.� Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942).
Other statutes are based on the text proposed by the American Law
Institute as part of the Institute�s Model Penal Code. See ALI, Model
Penal Code, �250.6, Comment 4, pp. 392�393 (1980). The provision,
originally designated �250.12, provides that a person who is loitering
�under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or
about to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses the request of
a peace officer that he identify himself and give a reasonably credible
account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes.� �250.12 (Tentative
Draft No. 13) (1961). In some States, a suspect�s refusal to identify
himself is a misdemeanor offense or civil violation; in others, it is a
factor to be considered in whether the suspect has violated loitering
laws. In other States, a suspect may decline to identify himself without
penalty.

Stop and identify statutes have their roots in early English vagrancy laws
that required suspected vagrants to face arrest unless they gave �a good
Account of themselves,� 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, �2 (1744), a power that itself
reflected common-law rights of private persons to �arrest any suspicious
night-walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself � .� 2
W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 13, �6, p. 130. (6th ed. 1787). In
recent decades, the Court has found constitutional infirmity in
traditional vagrancy laws. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972), the Court held that a traditional vagrancy law was void for
vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms denied proper notice to
potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise unfettered
discretion in the enforcement of the law. See id., at 167�171.

The Court has recognized similar constitutional limitations on the scope
and operation of stop and identify statutes. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 52 (1979), the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas
stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled
that the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts
establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in
criminal activity. See id., at 51�52. Absent that factual basis for
detaining the defendant, the Court held, the risk of �arbitrary and
abusive police practices� was too great and the stop was impermissible.
Id., at 52. Four Terms later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and
identify statute on vagueness grounds. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352 (1983). The California law in Kolender required a suspect to give an
officer � �credible and reliable� � identification when asked to identify
himself. Id., at 360. The Court held that the statute was void because it
provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with
it, resulting in � �virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge
persons with a violation.� � Id., at 360 (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result)).