"Almost 20 years ago, political scientist Paul Brass published a book that set out to explain the production of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India. Focusing on half a century of riots in Aligarh, he convincingly implicated the police, criminal elements, members of Aligarh’s business community, and many of its leading political actors in the continuous effort to “produce” violence.

Brass argued that there were “institutionalised riot systems” in India. Another US-based political scientist Ashutosh Varshney opposed this idea at the time and suggested that there were “institutionalised peace systems” in India, in which various actors came to a civic understanding that put an end to violence. Varshney’s work was heavily criticised, among others by Brass.

Beyond academic quibbles, Suketu Mehta’s magisterial Maximum City brought home how collective violence is part of the Indian every day: “All the accumulated insults, rebukes, and disappointments of life in a decaying megalopolis come out in a cathartic release of anger… All of a sudden you feel powerful. You can take on anybody. It is not their city anymore, it is your city.” The violence that perhaps was once more connected to periodic elections has become ubiquitous.
....
On the one hand, Hansen argues that violence is foundational to India’s democracy. He points at the colonial state’s authorisation of extensive use of force to quell collective violence. The 1857 revolt of soldiers had made the British deeply fearful of the violent potential of the colonised. However, more than the colonial state, Hansen sees Hindu-Muslim antagonism, culminating in the Partition, as the violent foundation of Indian politics. It is the simultaneous closeness and distance between communities that leads to ethnic and religious fratricide.

On the other hand, Hansen argues that after the 1980s collective violence has changed dramatically. ‘Lower caste’ communities have been increasingly mobilised for political demands. This has been met with a violent backlash. The other obvious change has been the growing strength of the RSS family before and after the demolition of the Babri mosque Ayodhya in 1992. All of this has resulted in the acceptance of public violence as part of politics."

On Thursday, May 6, 2021 at 10:49:53 AM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
> "Almost 20 years ago, political scientist Paul Brass published a book that set out to explain the production of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India. Focusing on half a century of riots in Aligarh, he convincingly implicated the police, criminal elements, members of Aligarh’s business community, and many of its leading political actors in the continuous effort to “produce” violence.
>
> Brass argued that there were “institutionalised riot systems” in India. Another US-based political scientist Ashutosh Varshney opposed this idea at the time and suggested that there were “institutionalised peace systems” in India, in which various actors came to a civic understanding that put an end to violence. Varshney’s work was heavily criticised, among others by Brass.
>
> Beyond academic quibbles, Suketu Mehta’s magisterial Maximum City brought home how collective violence is part of the Indian every day: “All the accumulated insults, rebukes, and disappointments of life in a decaying megalopolis come out in a cathartic release of anger… All of a sudden you feel powerful. You can take on anybody. It is not their city anymore, it is your city.” The violence that perhaps was once more connected to periodic elections has become ubiquitous.
> ...
> On the one hand, Hansen argues that violence is foundational to India’s democracy. He points at the colonial state’s authorisation of extensive use of force to quell collective violence. The 1857 revolt of soldiers had made the British deeply fearful of the violent potential of the colonised. However, more than the colonial state, Hansen sees Hindu-Muslim antagonism, culminating in the Partition, as the violent foundation of Indian politics. It is the simultaneous closeness and distance between communities that leads to ethnic and religious fratricide.
>
> On the other hand, Hansen argues that after the 1980s collective violence has changed dramatically. ‘Lower caste’ communities have been increasingly mobilised for political demands. This has been met with a violent backlash. The other obvious change has been the growing strength of the RSS family before and after the demolition of the Babri mosque Ayodhya in 1992. All of this has resulted in the acceptance of public violence as part of politics."
https://thewire.in/books/book-review-how-violence-took-centre-stage-in-indian-politics