https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/determined-a-science-of-life-without-free-will/
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Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will
Determined

Robert M. Sapolsky, Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will, Penguin Press, 2023, 528pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780525560975.

Reviewed by John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside

2023.11.3

This is a big, splashy book, both in number of pages and ambitions. It is much ballyhooed, receiving reviews and attention throughout the Anglophone world. Sapolsky wishes to disabuse us of what he takes to be our false beliefs that we are free and morally responsible, and even active agents, three central and foundational aspects of human life and our navigation of it. Much of the book contains summaries (necessarily somewhat brief) of various scientific and mathematical fields (and sub-areas) relevant to his topics: neuroscience (the appendix is a “primer on neuroscience”), chaos theory, quantum mechanics, emergence, and some results from psychology and sociology.

It is a compendious book. The summaries will be helpful in bringing readers up to speed, or at least beginning that process, in a wide variety of disciplines and areas of inquiry. Whereas many in the history of philosophy have contended that all our mental states and behavior are causally determined, a significant feature of this book is to fill in this claim with its specific empirical basis. The view that causal determinism is true is not new, nor is the view that this entails no free will or moral responsibility, but Sapolsky collates and marshals the evidence (some of it recent and cutting-edge) as it bears on these issues. The cumulative effect of the discussions and Sapolsky’s analyses can be an overwhelming sense that we might be wrong about our very foundational beliefs in free will and moral responsibility, and even our selfhood. He writes, “…put all the scientific results together, from all the relevant scientific disciplines, and there’s no room for free will” (8; emphasis in text).[1]

Considered as philosophy, however, the picture is very different. Right off the bat, one is struck by the title. Sapolsky writes, “This book … is both about the science of why there is no free will and the science of how we might best live once we accept that.” (10) But these do not appear to be scientific questions. Science, of course, is relevant; but that does not make free will a scientific question. Note that slavery is beyond a doubt morally wrong. The empirical facts about slavery are relevant, but this does not make the issue of the moral justifiability of slavery a scientific question. How we should adjust our attitudes and behavior in light of a belief in determinism, if we were to acquire such a belief, is definitely not a scientific question.

Surprisingly, in a book about free will, Sapolsky offers no definition of it (or, for that matter, determinism—or even moral responsibility!). He writes, “What is free will? Groan… I’ll do my best to mitigate the drag of this” (14). Although he does not present a full definition proper, it is clear that he holds that free will requires the falsity of determinism—by definition (not as a result of argumentation):

[To establish free will] [s]how me a neuron being a causeless cause in this total sense. …Show me a neuron (or brain) whose generation of a behavior is independent of the sum of its biological past, and for the purposes of this book, you’ve demonstrated free will. (15)

This is problematic in various ways. First, it claims that “being a causeless cause” or “independent of the sum of its biological past” would be sufficient for a choice/action’s being an instance of free will. This is however surely false; pure randomness is incompatible with the control involved in free will. (In his discussion of quantum indeterminacy, Sapolsky is aware of this.) More plausibly, we should interpret him (here and throughout the book) as contending that, as a matter of definition or “meaning,” indeterminism is a necessary condition of free will. Note that the indeterminism of “causeless cause” or “independent of the sum of its biological past” is a very strong kind of indeterminism, leaving out the more appealing idea of not being fully determined by antecedent causes. (Sapolsky elides the distinction between causation and deterministic causation and thus does not consider indeterministic causal accounts of free will).

------------------------------------------------------------------

Two analogies come to mind.
1) The Stone soup: Free will is the stone of the stone soup. But of course, the stone is totally not needed to make the soup, objectively speaking.
2)The traffic jam: Is a traffic jam the result of no free will because no one will a traffic jam such that one could reach a destination late? Or the result of too many free will, each wants to get to the destination sooner than later and takes the supposedly best route?

On Saturday, December 23, 2023 at 2:00:49 PM UTC, ltlee1 wrote:
> https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/determined-a-science-of-life-without-free-will/
> -----------------------------------------------------------------
> Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will
> Determined
>
> Robert M. Sapolsky, Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will, Penguin Press, 2023, 528pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780525560975.
>
> Reviewed by John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
>
> 2023.11.3
>
> This is a big, splashy book, both in number of pages and ambitions. It is much ballyhooed, receiving reviews and attention throughout the Anglophone world. Sapolsky wishes to disabuse us of what he takes to be our false beliefs that we are free and morally responsible, and even active agents, three central and foundational aspects of human life and our navigation of it. Much of the book contains summaries (necessarily somewhat brief) of various scientific and mathematical fields (and sub-areas) relevant to his topics: neuroscience (the appendix is a “primer on neuroscience”), chaos theory, quantum mechanics, emergence, and some results from psychology and sociology.
>
> It is a compendious book. The summaries will be helpful in bringing readers up to speed, or at least beginning that process, in a wide variety of disciplines and areas of inquiry. Whereas many in the history of philosophy have contended that all our mental states and behavior are causally determined, a significant feature of this book is to fill in this claim with its specific empirical basis. The view that causal determinism is true is not new, nor is the view that this entails no free will or moral responsibility, but Sapolsky collates and marshals the evidence (some of it recent and cutting-edge) as it bears on these issues. The cumulative effect of the discussions and Sapolsky’s analyses can be an overwhelming sense that we might be wrong about our very foundational beliefs in free will and moral responsibility, and even our selfhood. He writes, “…put all the scientific results together, from all the relevant scientific disciplines, and there’s no room for free will” (8; emphasis in text).[1]
>
> Considered as philosophy, however, the picture is very different. Right off the bat, one is struck by the title. Sapolsky writes, “This book … is both about the science of why there is no free will and the science of how we might best live once we accept that.” (10) But these do not appear to be scientific questions. Science, of course, is relevant; but that does not make free will a scientific question. Note that slavery is beyond a doubt morally wrong. The empirical facts about slavery are relevant, but this does not make the issue of the moral justifiability of slavery a scientific question. How we should adjust our attitudes and behavior in light of a belief in determinism, if we were to acquire such a belief, is definitely not a scientific question.
>
> Surprisingly, in a book about free will, Sapolsky offers no definition of it (or, for that matter, determinism—or even moral responsibility!). He writes, “What is free will? Groan… I’ll do my best to mitigate the drag of this” (14). Although he does not present a full definition proper, it is clear that he holds that free will requires the falsity of determinism—by definition (not as a result of argumentation):
>
> [To establish free will] [s]how me a neuron being a causeless cause in this total sense. …Show me a neuron (or brain) whose generation of a behavior is independent of the sum of its biological past, and for the purposes of this book, you’ve demonstrated free will. (15)
>
> This is problematic in various ways. First, it claims that “being a causeless cause” or “independent of the sum of its biological past” would be sufficient for a choice/action’s being an instance of free will. This is however surely false; pure randomness is incompatible with the control involved in free will. (In his discussion of quantum indeterminacy, Sapolsky is aware of this.) More plausibly, we should interpret him (here and throughout the book) as contending that, as a matter of definition or “meaning,” indeterminism is a necessary condition of free will. Note that the indeterminism of “causeless cause” or “independent of the sum of its biological past” is a very strong kind of indeterminism, leaving out the more appealing idea of not being fully determined by antecedent causes. (Sapolsky elides the distinction between causation and deterministic causation and thus does not consider indeterministic causal accounts of free will).
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Two analogies come to mind.
> 1) The Stone soup: Free will is the stone of the stone soup. But of course, the stone is totally not needed to make the soup, objectively speaking.
> 2)The traffic jam: Is a traffic jam the result of no free will because no one will a traffic jam such that one could reach a destination late? Or the result of too many free will, each wants to get to the destination sooner than later and takes the supposedly best route?

Actually, the reviewer, John Martin Fischer of University of California does not get Robert M. Sapolsky's thesis
right. Whether earth's lives could thrive without "free will" is a scientific question.

But humans do subjectively and inter-subjectively find the concept of free will useful and/or REAL. So, how real or in
what way "free will" is real. The following from Bing Chat with GPT-4 provides the following answer:

1) "In summary, the concept of “free will” is a psychological construct that has been examined by scholars from various
fields. While there is no scientific consensus against free will, there are many reasons to question its existence.
Nonetheless, belief in free will is very real and can have important implications for how we view ourselves and others 1."

2) "Psychological constructs are real in the sense that they are mental concepts that are used to describe, explain,
and predict human behavior and experience. They are not physical entities that can be directly observed or measured.
For example, constructs such as intelligence, personality, and emotions are widely used in psychology to understand
human behavior and experience. These constructs are real in the sense that they are useful for understanding and
predicting human behavior, but they are not real in the sense that they are physical entities that can be directly observed
or measured 1.

Psychological constructs are socially constructed in the sense that they are created and maintained by social processes.
They are not universal or objective features of the world, but rather are shaped by cultural and historical factors. For
example, the construct of intelligence has been defined and measured in different ways across cultures and historical
periods 1.

It is important to note that while psychological constructs are not physical entities, they can have real-world consequences.
For example, the construct of race is a social construct that has been used to justify discrimination and oppression
throughout history 1."

It is obvious that the concept of "free will" also has real world consequences.

May be the question is in what way it is useful or not useful.

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 at 7:45:02 PM UTC, ltlee1 wrote:
> On Saturday, December 23, 2023 at 2:00:49 PM UTC, ltlee1 wrote:
> > https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/determined-a-science-of-life-without-free-will/
> > -----------------------------------------------------------------
> > Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will
> > Determined
> >
> > Robert M. Sapolsky, Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will, Penguin Press, 2023, 528pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780525560975.
> >
> > Reviewed by John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
> >
> > 2023.11.3
> >
> > This is a big, splashy book, both in number of pages and ambitions. It is much ballyhooed, receiving reviews and attention throughout the Anglophone world. Sapolsky wishes to disabuse us of what he takes to be our false beliefs that we are free and morally responsible, and even active agents, three central and foundational aspects of human life and our navigation of it.. Much of the book contains summaries (necessarily somewhat brief) of various scientific and mathematical fields (and sub-areas) relevant to his topics: neuroscience (the appendix is a “primer on neuroscience”), chaos theory, quantum mechanics, emergence, and some results from psychology and sociology.
> >
> > It is a compendious book. The summaries will be helpful in bringing readers up to speed, or at least beginning that process, in a wide variety of disciplines and areas of inquiry. Whereas many in the history of philosophy have contended that all our mental states and behavior are causally determined, a significant feature of this book is to fill in this claim with its specific empirical basis. The view that causal determinism is true is not new, nor is the view that this entails no free will or moral responsibility, but Sapolsky collates and marshals the evidence (some of it recent and cutting-edge) as it bears on these issues. The cumulative effect of the discussions and Sapolsky’s analyses can be an overwhelming sense that we might be wrong about our very foundational beliefs in free will and moral responsibility, and even our selfhood. He writes, “…put all the scientific results together, from all the relevant scientific disciplines, and there’s no room for free will” (8; emphasis in text).[1]
> >
> > Considered as philosophy, however, the picture is very different. Right off the bat, one is struck by the title. Sapolsky writes, “This book … is both about the science of why there is no free will and the science of how we might best live once we accept that.” (10) But these do not appear to be scientific questions. Science, of course, is relevant; but that does not make free will a scientific question. Note that slavery is beyond a doubt morally wrong. The empirical facts about slavery are relevant, but this does not make the issue of the moral justifiability of slavery a scientific question. How we should adjust our attitudes and behavior in light of a belief in determinism, if we were to acquire such a belief, is definitely not a scientific question.
> >
> > Surprisingly, in a book about free will, Sapolsky offers no definition of it (or, for that matter, determinism—or even moral responsibility!). He writes, “What is free will? Groan… I’ll do my best to mitigate the drag of this” (14). Although he does not present a full definition proper, it is clear that he holds that free will requires the falsity of determinism—by definition (not as a result of argumentation):
> >
> > [To establish free will] [s]how me a neuron being a causeless cause in this total sense. …Show me a neuron (or brain) whose generation of a behavior is independent of the sum of its biological past, and for the purposes of this book, you’ve demonstrated free will. (15)
> >
> > This is problematic in various ways. First, it claims that “being a causeless cause” or “independent of the sum of its biological past” would be sufficient for a choice/action’s being an instance of free will. This is however surely false; pure randomness is incompatible with the control involved in free will. (In his discussion of quantum indeterminacy, Sapolsky is aware of this.) More plausibly, we should interpret him (here and throughout the book) as contending that, as a matter of definition or “meaning,” indeterminism is a necessary condition of free will. Note that the indeterminism of “causeless cause” or “independent of the sum of its biological past” is a very strong kind of indeterminism, leaving out the more appealing idea of not being fully determined by antecedent causes. (Sapolsky elides the distinction between causation and deterministic causation and thus does not consider indeterministic causal accounts of free will).
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Two analogies come to mind.
> > 1) The Stone soup: Free will is the stone of the stone soup. But of course, the stone is totally not needed to make the soup, objectively speaking..
> > 2)The traffic jam: Is a traffic jam the result of no free will because no one will a traffic jam such that one could reach a destination late? Or the result of too many free will, each wants to get to the destination sooner than later and takes the supposedly best route?
> Actually, the reviewer, John Martin Fischer of University of California does not get Robert M. Sapolsky's thesis
> right. Whether earth's lives could thrive without "free will" is a scientific question.
>
> But humans do subjectively and inter-subjectively find the concept of free will useful and/or REAL. So, how real or in
> what way "free will" is real. The following from Bing Chat with GPT-4 provides the following answer:
>
> 1) "In summary, the concept of “free will” is a psychological construct that has been examined by scholars from various
> fields. While there is no scientific consensus against free will, there are many reasons to question its existence.
> Nonetheless, belief in free will is very real and can have important implications for how we view ourselves and others 1."
>
> 2) "Psychological constructs are real in the sense that they are mental concepts that are used to describe, explain,
> and predict human behavior and experience. They are not physical entities that can be directly observed or measured.
> For example, constructs such as intelligence, personality, and emotions are widely used in psychology to understand
> human behavior and experience. These constructs are real in the sense that they are useful for understanding and
> predicting human behavior, but they are not real in the sense that they are physical entities that can be directly observed
> or measured 1.
>
> Psychological constructs are socially constructed in the sense that they are created and maintained by social processes.
> They are not universal or objective features of the world, but rather are shaped by cultural and historical factors. For
> example, the construct of intelligence has been defined and measured in different ways across cultures and historical
> periods 1.
>
> It is important to note that while psychological constructs are not physical entities, they can have real-world consequences.
> For example, the construct of race is a social construct that has been used to justify discrimination and oppression
> throughout history 1."
>
> It is obvious that the concept of "free will" also has real world consequences.
>
> May be the question is in what way it is useful or not useful.

In the stone soup analogy, the stone is supposedly needed to make the soup great. But in reality
does not contribute. Only if the villagers are more informed. In real life, freedom is also exercised
because of culture and/or ignorance. Example:

"Another fairy godmother of female genitalia is Rebecca Chalker, who is an outspoken critic of vaginal surgery. It was easy to find her: Just Google “anti labiaplasty” and go down the black hole. She’s the author of The Clitoral Truth: The Secret World at Your Fingertips, a book that more or less makes the case that the clitoris should win the Golden Globe for best piece of human anatomy. When we began speaking, I still had complicated feelings about the surgery—it seemed drastic and unnecessary, yet I appreciated that it helped many women feel better about themselves. Seeing that I was torn, I asked Chalker a question straight out of Alinsod’s playbook.
“How can you say that this surgery is bad when it’s giving women a choice?”
Chalker, it turns out, doesn’t believe that there is an actual choice. She thinks we have only the illusion of options. “Say I’m offering you a choice between two things: apples and oranges,” she said. “So if I go into the next room and I say, ‘Take your choice,’ but there is only a bowl of apples, what do you say?”
“I say, ‘Where’s my oranges?’”
“That’s the flaw,” she said. “That is the flaw of that argument. It’s not a choice! They aren’t offering women a choice; the choice is that their genitals are freaky.” Chalker went on to explain that the main problem is that women aren’t introduced to the diversity that can exist in their crotches. “We grow up with Barbies!” she said. “We only see the versions in porn and magazines.”
She pointed me to a study published in BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, which measured the range in size of women’s genitals. The study was conducted in 2005 and is one of the first to research female genital variation. Meanwhile, the first article of this nature on men was published in the 1800s—before telephones were common in modern American households.
The study showed a vast range of normal. For example, in the sample size of fifty vulvas, women’s inner lips measured up to four inches long. In other words, normal healthy inner lips can exceed the length of a toiletpaper roll.
“But there’s no honoring the diversity of women’s genitals,” Chalker lamented.
Both women, Caputi and Chalker, mentioned the importance of not blaming or judging women for getting the surgery, but rather blaming our culture, which gives us little space to be who we are.
Caputi said it best: “I would never be against someone making a choice to do something that makes them feel empowered or feel good about themselves, but I would rather work toward a world where women are not so systematically shamed about their bodies, where we don’t have such fear and loathing in particular of female sexuality and anything including large labia that smack of female power.” (From Gross Anatomy by Mara Altman)