"Ukraine’s much-anticipated summer counteroffensive has all but ground to a halt.
....
Western arms deliveries offer little relief. Most of the pledged main battle tanks are already in the theater, and there is limited prospect for further deliveries. Reaching for antiques like the German Leopard 1, first introduced in 1965, won’t be a gamechanger. The “fighter jet coalition” has pledged F-16s, but it’s unclear when and where these will be deployed. In any case, they would be outmatched against an increasingly active and confident Russian Air Force and Russia’s formidable integrated air defense. Stocks of precision weapons are shrinking, which clearly plays a role in the Biden administration’s refusal to provide ATACMS missiles, vital for American security in the Pacific.

Given this grim outlook, is a “Korea Scenario” the most likely outcome? This means that by the time the Ukrainian counteroffensive culminates sometime in late August or early September, the conflict freezes at territorial borders roughly corresponding to the frontline. In effect, Ukraine trades significant parts of the four regions annexed by Russia in 2022 for robust Western (American) security guarantees.

This certainly wouldn’t be the worst outcome from an American perspective. Washington would be able to gradually defuse tensions with Moscow and reestablish a dialogue on the future trajectory of the European security architecture."
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/case-american-led-peace-ukraine-206732

On Wednesday, August 23, 2023 at 4:01:48 PM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
> "Ukraine’s much-anticipated summer counteroffensive has all but ground to a halt.
> ...
> Western arms deliveries offer little relief. Most of the pledged main battle tanks are already in the theater, and there is limited prospect for further deliveries. Reaching for antiques like the German Leopard 1, first introduced in 1965, won’t be a gamechanger. The “fighter jet coalition” has pledged F-16s, but it’s unclear when and where these will be deployed. In any case, they would be outmatched against an increasingly active and confident Russian Air Force and Russia’s formidable integrated air defense. Stocks of precision weapons are shrinking, which clearly plays a role in the Biden administration’s refusal to provide ATACMS missiles, vital for American security in the Pacific.
>
> Given this grim outlook, is a “Korea Scenario” the most likely outcome? This means that by the time the Ukrainian counteroffensive culminates sometime in late August or early September, the conflict freezes at territorial borders roughly corresponding to the frontline. In effect, Ukraine trades significant parts of the four regions annexed by Russia in 2022 for robust Western (American) security guarantees.
>
> This certainly wouldn’t be the worst outcome from an American perspective. Washington would be able to gradually defuse tensions with Moscow and reestablish a dialogue on the future trajectory of the European security architecture."
> https://nationalinterest.org/feature/case-american-led-peace-ukraine-206732

Look like White House wants to continue. But a group of former US officials want to end the war.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/former-us-officials-secret-ukraine-talks-russians-war-ukraine-rcna92610

"A group of former senior U.S. national security officials has held secret talks with prominent Russians
believed to be close to the Kremlin — and, in at least one case, with the country’s top diplomat — with
the aim of laying the groundwork for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, half a dozen people briefed
on the discussions said.

In a high-level example of the back-channel diplomacy taking place behind the scenes, Russian Foreign
Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov met with members of the group for several hours in April in New York, four
former officials and two current officials said.

On the agenda were some of the thorniest issues in the war in Ukraine, like the fate of Russian-held territory
that Ukraine may never be able to liberate and the search for an elusive diplomatic off-ramp that could be
tolerable to both sides.

Meeting with Lavrov were Richard Haass, a former diplomat and the outgoing president of the Council on
Foreign Relations, current and former officials said. The group was joined by Europe expert Charles
Kupchan and Russia expert Thomas Graham, both former White House and State Department officials
who are Council on Foreign Relations fellows. "

On Saturday, August 26, 2023 at 7:43:58 PM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
> On Wednesday, August 23, 2023 at 4:01:48 PM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
> > "Ukraine’s much-anticipated summer counteroffensive has all but ground to a halt.
> > ...
> > Western arms deliveries offer little relief. Most of the pledged main battle tanks are already in the theater, and there is limited prospect for further deliveries. Reaching for antiques like the German Leopard 1, first introduced in 1965, won’t be a gamechanger. The “fighter jet coalition” has pledged F-16s, but it’s unclear when and where these will be deployed. In any case, they would be outmatched against an increasingly active and confident Russian Air Force and Russia’s formidable integrated air defense. Stocks of precision weapons are shrinking, which clearly plays a role in the Biden administration’s refusal to provide ATACMS missiles, vital for American security in the Pacific.
> >
> > Given this grim outlook, is a “Korea Scenario” the most likely outcome? This means that by the time the Ukrainian counteroffensive culminates sometime in late August or early September, the conflict freezes at territorial borders roughly corresponding to the frontline. In effect, Ukraine trades significant parts of the four regions annexed by Russia in 2022 for robust Western (American) security guarantees.
> >
> > This certainly wouldn’t be the worst outcome from an American perspective. Washington would be able to gradually defuse tensions with Moscow and reestablish a dialogue on the future trajectory of the European security architecture."
> > https://nationalinterest.org/feature/case-american-led-peace-ukraine-206732
> Look like White House wants to continue. But a group of former US officials want to end the war.
> https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/former-us-officials-secret-ukraine-talks-russians-war-ukraine-rcna92610
>
> "A group of former senior U.S. national security officials has held secret talks with prominent Russians
> believed to be close to the Kremlin — and, in at least one case, with the country’s top diplomat — with
> the aim of laying the groundwork for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, half a dozen people briefed
> on the discussions said.
>
> In a high-level example of the back-channel diplomacy taking place behind the scenes, Russian Foreign
> Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov met with members of the group for several hours in April in New York, four
> former officials and two current officials said.
>
> On the agenda were some of the thorniest issues in the war in Ukraine, like the fate of Russian-held territory
> that Ukraine may never be able to liberate and the search for an elusive diplomatic off-ramp that could be
> tolerable to both sides.
>
> Meeting with Lavrov were Richard Haass, a former diplomat and the outgoing president of the Council on
> Foreign Relations, current and former officials said. The group was joined by Europe expert Charles
> Kupchan and Russia expert Thomas Graham, both former White House and State Department officials
> who are Council on Foreign Relations fellows. "

Paul Pillar had a career in the U.S. intelligence community for 28 years. He is on the side of peace and defends
the realist view. But he also thinks the peace process could be complex and took time.

"An aversion to realist analysis about matters of war and peace has been one of the most unhelpful features of much past vocalizing
by antiwar activists. That aversion appears to be based on a mistaken view of realism as a sucking of moral considerations out of
matters that, like war, involve life and death. In fact, realism does not add or subtract moral or other values to a nation. It instead entails
a careful examination of how all the features of the real world—including the ugly and disagreeable ones—bear upon whatever values,
interests, and objectives the nation pursues.

In wartime, the disagreeable features may include the objectives of an adversary and how the war must be shaped to get that adversary
to agree to an acceptable peace. That was part of the reality that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger faced when extracting the United
States from the Vietnam War. It is part of the reality that Ukraine and its Western backers face today in dealing with the Russian invaders.
I have offered some thoughts about what that reality means for bringing peace to Ukraine. Others will have other thoughts.

Does the war in Ukraine, given the positions described in the Times article, mark a turning point in how the community of peace activists
responds to wars? Crowley mentions, as factors that distinguish the current situation from previous episodes such as the war in Iraq, the
obvious fact that U.S. forces are not fighting in Ukraine, along with the desire among some left-leaning activists not to make political life
difficult for the Biden administration. But there is more to the current responses than that. A group such as Win Without War is to be
commended for a position that not only reflects the difference between the United States committing aggression and defense against
someone else’s aggression but also shows a nuanced appreciation for the line that the administration is trying to walk by aiding the
Ukrainians while limiting U.S. costs and commitments.

Nonetheless, there always will be others in the traditional banner-waving mode. It feels satisfying to simplify things into a matter of peace vs.
war, and right vs. wrong, and to see oneself as being on the side of the right."

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/achieving-peace-ukraine-more-complicated-some-would-think-206743