https://ecfr.eu/publication/keeping-america-close-russia-down-and-china-far-away-how-europeans-navigate-a-competitive-world/#china-is-not-russia

"Summary
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality.
Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public.
Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy.
They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees.
European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
....
“China is not Russia”
In November 2022, shortly after Xi Jinping had secured his third term as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, paid his respects to the Chinese leader with a state visit. Since then, various European leaders have made their way to Beijing: from European Council president, Charles Michel, to Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, to the joint visit by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and French president Emmanuel Macron in April 2023. But these trips have not signalled European unity on China. To the contrary, European governments hold different views about Europe’s approach to China, with von der Leyen and Macron at opposite ends of the spectrum.

In a keynote speech in March 2023, von der Leyen used unusually strong words to describe China’s strategic priorities. In her view, Beijing is striving for security and control instead of reform and opening, and is aiming to systemically change the international order, making China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China. Von der Leyen dispensed with the EU’s established triad to describe China as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival” and emphasised the need for active, strategic, multidimensional risk minimisation in Europe’s dealings with Beijing. With this strategy of “de-risking”, she pushed for a new consensus in Europe on the importance of revisiting its relationship with China.

For his part, Macron struck a much more conciliatory tone in Beijing, advocating greater rapprochement after three years of China’s rigorous “zero covid” restrictions. Contrary to von der Leyen’s de-risking approach, Macron spoke of reviving the strategic and global partnership with China and deliberately avoided critical remarks on the subject of Taiwan. Like Scholz before him, Macron was accompanied by a business delegation, which concluded numerous agreements in China. Macron’s message to Xi was clear: Paris wants close economic relations with Beijing, even if China does not oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and continues to maintain close relations with the Kremlin. In fact, Macron has often suggested that the EU should work with China to solve the Russia problem.

The findings of ECFR’s latest poll show that, in many ways, European citizens are more on Team Macron than Team von der Leyen. They do not see China as a power that challenges and wants to undermine Europe, and they do not buy into the “democracy versus autocracy” framework promoted by the Biden administration."