Excellent Insight on how China the NATO dominated West interact.

https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-and-the-crisis/

"Of course, if there had not been an active rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing over the past decades, there would have been no Asian alternative to the European markets for Russian oil and gas, and nothing would have happened on February 24. At the same time, if China had not taken the position of benevolent neutrality with respect to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and had not continued to buy Russian goods and provide a reliable strategic rearguard, no continuation of “February 24” would objectively have happened.

But is China the main beneficiary of the European crisis? Is the situation developing according to the Chinese plan? For me, the answer is obviously “no.”

The current development of events was not desirable for China and does not meet its interests. China itself is convinced that perhaps the only party that will now benefit is Washington—which it calls the “warmonger” (Zhang and Wan, 2022).

The imbalance of international stability allows the United States to establish new rules of the game in relations with its allies, sell them even more oil and weapons and thereby strengthen its global hegemony.

The consolidation of the “collective West,” based on the imaginary dichotomy of the “confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism” (Brands, 2018) (effectively, a “battle between Good and Evil”), harms China’s interests as it cuts off its path to normalizing relations with the United States, which are beneficial to Beijing for purely economic reasons. It also reduces China’s room for maneuver in Europe, which is a key market for Chinese goods. And this is in addition to the sharp rise in energy and food prices which are necessary for the stable development of the Chinese economy (Zuenko, 2022a).

In general, the conflict has made things more difficult for China. In recent years, the country has been preparing for the fact that sooner or later its natural ambitions for the role of one of the world leaders (the concept of the “Chinese Dream”) will have to be backed by muscle-flexing (Kashin, 2015).

Economic pressure, anti-Chinese sanctions, and aggressive rhetoric from Western leaders over the past five years have simply left the Chinese no choice but to prepare for a future war, whether it is a “hybrid war” or traditional “trench warfare.” However, events have moved too quickly, and now Beijing does not feel ready enough to take decisive action as Moscow did.

Moreover, China thinks that time is on its side, and Beijing’s task is to keep a neutral position for as long as possible, building up strength and hoping for a weakening of competitors.

Euro-Atlantic capitals also understand this and have stepped up geopolitical pressure on China. The idea of “indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region” has already appeared in their rhetoric, which actually implies the creation of a “global NATO.” From the European security perspective, the crisis is truly becoming a global one (The Frontier Post, 2022).

In practice, a “global NATO” is already being created, and the Madrid summit in late June testifies to that. For the first time in NATO’s history, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea were invited to attend. Measures have been intensified to form “quasi-alliances” such as QUAD (the Quadripartite Security Dialogue of the USA, Australia, Japan, and India) and AUKUS (tripartite pact of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and, finally, Partners in the Blue Pacific (AUKUS plus Japan and New Zealand). In contrast to the “classical NATO,” which for a long time was perceived by China as a vestige of the Cold War and intra-Western conflicts (Sun, 2018, p. 22), these alliances are unequivocally anti-Chinese (Marlow, 2021).

In response, China is trying to launch a network of partnerships with the island states of Oceania (Perry, 2022). However, there has been almost no success in this respect so far, and even a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, as it appears, does not involve the construction of a Chinese naval base (Ng, 2022). In other words, China has no other serious military-political partners in the Pacific except Russia (Kashin, 2019).

Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to East Asia in May has expectedly launched a new round of tensions in the region (French, 2022). Taiwan again acted as a “red rag for the bull”—a de facto independent island, whose return to a united China has been a historical task of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, it should be obvious to Beijing that the situation is not confined to pressure on Russia, which has crossed the “red lines” (Ellyatt, 2022), but that there may be some clear “red lines” set with regard to China’s behavior, and that “non-crossing” of them will be a guarantee against interference in its internal affairs.

China should also understand that Washington’s end goal is to systemically curb Beijing’s very ability to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.

The pressure on China will be persisting. There is a large number of “pain points” which the so-called “world community” can complain about to the PRC: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, labor migrants, political opposition, greenhouse gas emissions, lack of democratic elections, and possible victory of a “wrong candidate” (even if such elections are introduced), and so on ad infinitum.

Therefore, in fact, there is no “dilemma of choice” that Chinese experts speak of (Zuenko, 2022c). Amid Western statements that “China is a systemic threat to NATO’s interests, security and values” (Qin and Ramzy, 2022), a return to the model of relations between the globalized “Western world” and a globalizing China, which existed until the mid-2010s, is simply impossible with Beijing’s current authorities.

They can only delay the final break as much as possible, maintaining the partnership with Russia, rebuilding the economy, building up military and political potential, and waiting for the West to swallow its own problems. As Silvio Berlusconi (2022) rightly noted in his recent essay, “Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world”; by the “world” he meant the vast “Third world” (incidentally, echoing Mao Zedong (1974)), which is increasingly getting annoyed with the fact that it again has to suffer from a “European war.”[1]

This, in fact, constitutes China’s fundamental interest amid the current crisis. "

On Tuesday, September 20, 2022 at 7:45:43 PM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> Excellent Insight on how China the NATO dominated West interact.
>
> https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-and-the-crisis/
>
> "Of course, if there had not been an active rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing over the past decades, there would have been no Asian alternative to the European markets for Russian oil and gas, and nothing would have happened on February 24. At the same time, if China had not taken the position of benevolent neutrality with respect to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and had not continued to buy Russian goods and provide a reliable strategic rearguard, no continuation of “February 24” would objectively have happened.
>
> But is China the main beneficiary of the European crisis? Is the situation developing according to the Chinese plan? For me, the answer is obviously “no.”
>
> The current development of events was not desirable for China and does not meet its interests. China itself is convinced that perhaps the only party that will now benefit is Washington—which it calls the “warmonger” (Zhang and Wan, 2022).
>
> The imbalance of international stability allows the United States to establish new rules of the game in relations with its allies, sell them even more oil and weapons and thereby strengthen its global hegemony.
>
> The consolidation of the “collective West,” based on the imaginary dichotomy of the “confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism” (Brands, 2018) (effectively, a “battle between Good and Evil”), harms China’s interests as it cuts off its path to normalizing relations with the United States, which are beneficial to Beijing for purely economic reasons. It also reduces China’s room for maneuver in Europe, which is a key market for Chinese goods. And this is in addition to the sharp rise in energy and food prices which are necessary for the stable development of the Chinese economy (Zuenko, 2022a).
>
> In general, the conflict has made things more difficult for China. In recent years, the country has been preparing for the fact that sooner or later its natural ambitions for the role of one of the world leaders (the concept of the “Chinese Dream”) will have to be backed by muscle-flexing (Kashin, 2015).
>
> Economic pressure, anti-Chinese sanctions, and aggressive rhetoric from Western leaders over the past five years have simply left the Chinese no choice but to prepare for a future war, whether it is a “hybrid war” or traditional “trench warfare.” However, events have moved too quickly, and now Beijing does not feel ready enough to take decisive action as Moscow did.
>
> Moreover, China thinks that time is on its side, and Beijing’s task is to keep a neutral position for as long as possible, building up strength and hoping for a weakening of competitors.
>
> Euro-Atlantic capitals also understand this and have stepped up geopolitical pressure on China. The idea of “indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region” has already appeared in their rhetoric, which actually implies the creation of a “global NATO.” From the European security perspective, the crisis is truly becoming a global one (The Frontier Post, 2022).
>
> In practice, a “global NATO” is already being created, and the Madrid summit in late June testifies to that. For the first time in NATO’s history, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea were invited to attend. Measures have been intensified to form “quasi-alliances” such as QUAD (the Quadripartite Security Dialogue of the USA, Australia, Japan, and India) and AUKUS (tripartite pact of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and, finally, Partners in the Blue Pacific (AUKUS plus Japan and New Zealand). In contrast to the “classical NATO,” which for a long time was perceived by China as a vestige of the Cold War and intra-Western conflicts (Sun, 2018, p. 22), these alliances are unequivocally anti-Chinese (Marlow, 2021).
>
> In response, China is trying to launch a network of partnerships with the island states of Oceania (Perry, 2022). However, there has been almost no success in this respect so far, and even a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, as it appears, does not involve the construction of a Chinese naval base (Ng, 2022). In other words, China has no other serious military-political partners in the Pacific except Russia (Kashin, 2019).
>
> Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to East Asia in May has expectedly launched a new round of tensions in the region (French, 2022).. Taiwan again acted as a “red rag for the bull”—a de facto independent island, whose return to a united China has been a historical task of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, it should be obvious to Beijing that the situation is not confined to pressure on Russia, which has crossed the “red lines” (Ellyatt, 2022), but that there may be some clear “red lines” set with regard to China’s behavior, and that “non-crossing” of them will be a guarantee against interference in its internal affairs.
>
> China should also understand that Washington’s end goal is to systemically curb Beijing’s very ability to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.
>
> The pressure on China will be persisting. There is a large number of “pain points” which the so-called “world community” can complain about to the PRC: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, labor migrants, political opposition, greenhouse gas emissions, lack of democratic elections, and possible victory of a “wrong candidate” (even if such elections are introduced), and so on ad infinitum.
>
> Therefore, in fact, there is no “dilemma of choice” that Chinese experts speak of (Zuenko, 2022c). Amid Western statements that “China is a systemic threat to NATO’s interests, security and values” (Qin and Ramzy, 2022), a return to the model of relations between the globalized “Western world” and a globalizing China, which existed until the mid-2010s, is simply impossible with Beijing’s current authorities.
>
> They can only delay the final break as much as possible, maintaining the partnership with Russia, rebuilding the economy, building up military and political potential, and waiting for the West to swallow its own problems. As Silvio Berlusconi (2022) rightly noted in his recent essay, “Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world”; by the “world” he meant the vast “Third world” (incidentally, echoing Mao Zedong (1974)), which is increasingly getting annoyed with the fact that it again has to suffer from a “European war.”[1]
>
> This, in fact, constitutes China’s fundamental interest amid the current crisis. "

Clearly those Western gangsters formed were intended to gang up against China. Hence China must be ready to fight at anytime. China should produce more weapons in order to fight long years.

On Tuesday, September 20, 2022 at 11:45:43 AM UTC, ltlee1 wrote:
> Excellent Insight on how China the NATO dominated West interact.
>
> https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-and-the-crisis/
>
> "Of course, if there had not been an active rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing over the past decades, there would have been no Asian alternative to the European markets for Russian oil and gas, and nothing would have happened on February 24. At the same time, if China had not taken the position of benevolent neutrality with respect to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and had not continued to buy Russian goods and provide a reliable strategic rearguard, no continuation of “February 24” would objectively have happened.
>
> But is China the main beneficiary of the European crisis? Is the situation developing according to the Chinese plan? For me, the answer is obviously “no.”
>
> The current development of events was not desirable for China and does not meet its interests. China itself is convinced that perhaps the only party that will now benefit is Washington—which it calls the “warmonger” (Zhang and Wan, 2022).
>
> The imbalance of international stability allows the United States to establish new rules of the game in relations with its allies, sell them even more oil and weapons and thereby strengthen its global hegemony.
>
> The consolidation of the “collective West,” based on the imaginary dichotomy of the “confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism” (Brands, 2018) (effectively, a “battle between Good and Evil”), harms China’s interests as it cuts off its path to normalizing relations with the United States, which are beneficial to Beijing for purely economic reasons. It also reduces China’s room for maneuver in Europe, which is a key market for Chinese goods. And this is in addition to the sharp rise in energy and food prices which are necessary for the stable development of the Chinese economy (Zuenko, 2022a).
>
> In general, the conflict has made things more difficult for China. In recent years, the country has been preparing for the fact that sooner or later its natural ambitions for the role of one of the world leaders (the concept of the “Chinese Dream”) will have to be backed by muscle-flexing (Kashin, 2015).
>
> Economic pressure, anti-Chinese sanctions, and aggressive rhetoric from Western leaders over the past five years have simply left the Chinese no choice but to prepare for a future war, whether it is a “hybrid war” or traditional “trench warfare.” However, events have moved too quickly, and now Beijing does not feel ready enough to take decisive action as Moscow did.
>
> Moreover, China thinks that time is on its side, and Beijing’s task is to keep a neutral position for as long as possible, building up strength and hoping for a weakening of competitors.
>
> Euro-Atlantic capitals also understand this and have stepped up geopolitical pressure on China. The idea of “indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region” has already appeared in their rhetoric, which actually implies the creation of a “global NATO.” From the European security perspective, the crisis is truly becoming a global one (The Frontier Post, 2022).
>
> In practice, a “global NATO” is already being created, and the Madrid summit in late June testifies to that. For the first time in NATO’s history, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea were invited to attend. Measures have been intensified to form “quasi-alliances” such as QUAD (the Quadripartite Security Dialogue of the USA, Australia, Japan, and India) and AUKUS (tripartite pact of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and, finally, Partners in the Blue Pacific (AUKUS plus Japan and New Zealand). In contrast to the “classical NATO,” which for a long time was perceived by China as a vestige of the Cold War and intra-Western conflicts (Sun, 2018, p. 22), these alliances are unequivocally anti-Chinese (Marlow, 2021).
>
> In response, China is trying to launch a network of partnerships with the island states of Oceania (Perry, 2022). However, there has been almost no success in this respect so far, and even a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, as it appears, does not involve the construction of a Chinese naval base (Ng, 2022). In other words, China has no other serious military-political partners in the Pacific except Russia (Kashin, 2019).
>
> Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to East Asia in May has expectedly launched a new round of tensions in the region (French, 2022).. Taiwan again acted as a “red rag for the bull”—a de facto independent island, whose return to a united China has been a historical task of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, it should be obvious to Beijing that the situation is not confined to pressure on Russia, which has crossed the “red lines” (Ellyatt, 2022), but that there may be some clear “red lines” set with regard to China’s behavior, and that “non-crossing” of them will be a guarantee against interference in its internal affairs.
>
> China should also understand that Washington’s end goal is to systemically curb Beijing’s very ability to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.
>
> The pressure on China will be persisting. There is a large number of “pain points” which the so-called “world community” can complain about to the PRC: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, labor migrants, political opposition, greenhouse gas emissions, lack of democratic elections, and possible victory of a “wrong candidate” (even if such elections are introduced), and so on ad infinitum.
>
> Therefore, in fact, there is no “dilemma of choice” that Chinese experts speak of (Zuenko, 2022c). Amid Western statements that “China is a systemic threat to NATO’s interests, security and values” (Qin and Ramzy, 2022), a return to the model of relations between the globalized “Western world” and a globalizing China, which existed until the mid-2010s, is simply impossible with Beijing’s current authorities.
>
> They can only delay the final break as much as possible, maintaining the partnership with Russia, rebuilding the economy, building up military and political potential, and waiting for the West to swallow its own problems. As Silvio Berlusconi (2022) rightly noted in his recent essay, “Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world”; by the “world” he meant the vast “Third world” (incidentally, echoing Mao Zedong (1974)), which is increasingly getting annoyed with the fact that it again has to suffer from a “European war.”[1]
>
> This, in fact, constitutes China’s fundamental interest amid the current crisis. "

Well, Russia is now showing its hand and decides to absorb the 4 provinces currently largely under its control.
Needless to say, Nato, especially, the US and the UK are quick to point finger at Russia for its aggression against
Ukraine. However, the underlying is beyond Russia and Ukraine.

"It is impossible to reduce them to merely relations between Russia and Ukraine. The situation in
Ukraine was the result of the fact that after the end of the Cold War the countries of the Euro-
Atlantic bloc did not want to create a comprehensive security system on the continent which would
include Russia (Trenin, 2018). Now, most of the countries of the world have been drawn into the
current conflict and its economic aspects in one way or another. Of course, China is no exception.
Moreover, in a situation where Russia’s foes have employed tactics such as “canceling” the country
and severing economic and humanitarian ties, the Chinese factor has turned out to be a key one
(Savchenko and Zuenko, 2020, p. 122)."

Another factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nations
in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?

On Tuesday, September 20, 2022 at 7:45:43 PM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> Excellent Insight on how China the NATO dominated West interact.
>
> https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-and-the-crisis/
>
> "Of course, if there had not been an active rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing over the past decades, there would have been no Asian alternative to the European markets for Russian oil and gas, and nothing would have happened on February 24. At the same time, if China had not taken the position of benevolent neutrality with respect to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and had not continued to buy Russian goods and provide a reliable strategic rearguard, no continuation of “February 24” would objectively have happened.
>
> But is China the main beneficiary of the European crisis? Is the situation developing according to the Chinese plan? For me, the answer is obviously “no.”
>
> The current development of events was not desirable for China and does not meet its interests. China itself is convinced that perhaps the only party that will now benefit is Washington—which it calls the “warmonger” (Zhang and Wan, 2022).
>
> The imbalance of international stability allows the United States to establish new rules of the game in relations with its allies, sell them even more oil and weapons and thereby strengthen its global hegemony.
>
> The consolidation of the “collective West,” based on the imaginary dichotomy of the “confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism” (Brands, 2018) (effectively, a “battle between Good and Evil”), harms China’s interests as it cuts off its path to normalizing relations with the United States, which are beneficial to Beijing for purely economic reasons. It also reduces China’s room for maneuver in Europe, which is a key market for Chinese goods. And this is in addition to the sharp rise in energy and food prices which are necessary for the stable development of the Chinese economy (Zuenko, 2022a).
>
> In general, the conflict has made things more difficult for China. In recent years, the country has been preparing for the fact that sooner or later its natural ambitions for the role of one of the world leaders (the concept of the “Chinese Dream”) will have to be backed by muscle-flexing (Kashin, 2015).
>
> Economic pressure, anti-Chinese sanctions, and aggressive rhetoric from Western leaders over the past five years have simply left the Chinese no choice but to prepare for a future war, whether it is a “hybrid war” or traditional “trench warfare.” However, events have moved too quickly, and now Beijing does not feel ready enough to take decisive action as Moscow did.
>
> Moreover, China thinks that time is on its side, and Beijing’s task is to keep a neutral position for as long as possible, building up strength and hoping for a weakening of competitors.
>
> Euro-Atlantic capitals also understand this and have stepped up geopolitical pressure on China. The idea of “indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region” has already appeared in their rhetoric, which actually implies the creation of a “global NATO.” From the European security perspective, the crisis is truly becoming a global one (The Frontier Post, 2022).
>
> In practice, a “global NATO” is already being created, and the Madrid summit in late June testifies to that. For the first time in NATO’s history, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea were invited to attend. Measures have been intensified to form “quasi-alliances” such as QUAD (the Quadripartite Security Dialogue of the USA, Australia, Japan, and India) and AUKUS (tripartite pact of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and, finally, Partners in the Blue Pacific (AUKUS plus Japan and New Zealand). In contrast to the “classical NATO,” which for a long time was perceived by China as a vestige of the Cold War and intra-Western conflicts (Sun, 2018, p. 22), these alliances are unequivocally anti-Chinese (Marlow, 2021).
>
> In response, China is trying to launch a network of partnerships with the island states of Oceania (Perry, 2022). However, there has been almost no success in this respect so far, and even a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, as it appears, does not involve the construction of a Chinese naval base (Ng, 2022). In other words, China has no other serious military-political partners in the Pacific except Russia (Kashin, 2019).
>
> Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to East Asia in May has expectedly launched a new round of tensions in the region (French, 2022).. Taiwan again acted as a “red rag for the bull”—a de facto independent island, whose return to a united China has been a historical task of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, it should be obvious to Beijing that the situation is not confined to pressure on Russia, which has crossed the “red lines” (Ellyatt, 2022), but that there may be some clear “red lines” set with regard to China’s behavior, and that “non-crossing” of them will be a guarantee against interference in its internal affairs.
>
> China should also understand that Washington’s end goal is to systemically curb Beijing’s very ability to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.
>
> The pressure on China will be persisting. There is a large number of “pain points” which the so-called “world community” can complain about to the PRC: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, labor migrants, political opposition, greenhouse gas emissions, lack of democratic elections, and possible victory of a “wrong candidate” (even if such elections are introduced), and so on ad infinitum.
>
> Therefore, in fact, there is no “dilemma of choice” that Chinese experts speak of (Zuenko, 2022c). Amid Western statements that “China is a systemic threat to NATO’s interests, security and values” (Qin and Ramzy, 2022), a return to the model of relations between the globalized “Western world” and a globalizing China, which existed until the mid-2010s, is simply impossible with Beijing’s current authorities.
>
> They can only delay the final break as much as possible, maintaining the partnership with Russia, rebuilding the economy, building up military and political potential, and waiting for the West to swallow its own problems. As Silvio Berlusconi (2022) rightly noted in his recent essay, “Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world”; by the “world” he meant the vast “Third world” (incidentally, echoing Mao Zedong (1974)), which is increasingly getting annoyed with the fact that it again has to suffer from a “European war.”[1]
>
> This, in fact, constitutes China’s fundamental interest amid the current crisis. "

Insightful.

On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 1:54:54 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:

> Another factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nations
> in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?

When was it? Why he was slighted by nations in the SCO? And for what reason?

On Wednesday, September 21, 2022 at 6:22:10 PM UTC, stoney wrote:
> On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 1:54:54 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
>
> > Another factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nations
> > in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?
> When was it? Why he was slighted by nations in the SCO? And for what reason?

"Xi, Putin stated, had “concerns” about the war in Ukraine, while Xi himself never once mentioned
Ukraine. Combined with anecdotal evidence of Xi’s supposed displeasure and Russia’s public
rebukes in the SCO, some Western analysts have rapidly concluded that the Sino-Russian entente
is off."
https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/sco-summit-did-not-show-what-you-think-it-showed/

Putin Mocked After Foreign Leaders Keep Him Waiting at SCO Summit
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-mocked-after-foreign-leaders-keep-him-waiting-at-sco-summit/ar-AA11WDVA

On Friday, September 23, 2022 at 12:35:57 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> On Wednesday, September 21, 2022 at 6:22:10 PM UTC, stoney wrote:
> > On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 1:54:54 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> >
> > > Another factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nations
> > > in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?
> > When was it? Why he was slighted by nations in the SCO? And for what reason?
> "Xi, Putin stated, had “concerns” about the war in Ukraine, while Xi himself never once mentioned
> Ukraine. Combined with anecdotal evidence of Xi’s supposed displeasure and Russia’s public
> rebukes in the SCO, some Western analysts have rapidly concluded that the Sino-Russian entente
> is off."
> https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/sco-summit-did-not-show-what-you-think-it-showed/
>
> Putin Mocked After Foreign Leaders Keep Him Waiting at SCO Summit
> https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-mocked-after-foreign-leaders-keep-him-waiting-at-sco-summit/ar-AA11WDVA

The Chinese "concern" is perhaps on Russia's progress. As to the mocking, the Western media wants to use that "waiting" to humiliate Putin, instead. Seriously, the clip on his waiting should have been clipped and removed before allowing media there to broadcast it. Media presented under the control by the host and has to subject to scrutiny of their recordings where it then checked and fast explained it. But all these are irrelevant to the core issue.

On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 6:09:00 PM UTC, stoney wrote:
> On Friday, September 23, 2022 at 12:35:57 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> > On Wednesday, September 21, 2022 at 6:22:10 PM UTC, stoney wrote:
> > > On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 1:54:54 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> > >
> > > > Another factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nations
> > > > in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?
> > > When was it? Why he was slighted by nations in the SCO? And for what reason?
> > "Xi, Putin stated, had “concerns” about the war in Ukraine, while Xi himself never once mentioned
> > Ukraine. Combined with anecdotal evidence of Xi’s supposed displeasure and Russia’s public
> > rebukes in the SCO, some Western analysts have rapidly concluded that the Sino-Russian entente
> > is off."
> > https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/sco-summit-did-not-show-what-you-think-it-showed/
> >
> > Putin Mocked After Foreign Leaders Keep Him Waiting at SCO Summit
> > https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-mocked-after-foreign-leaders-keep-him-waiting-at-sco-summit/ar-AA11WDVA
> The Chinese "concern" is perhaps on Russia's progress. As to the mocking, the Western media wants to use that "waiting" to humiliate Putin, instead. Seriously, the clip on his waiting should have been clipped and removed before allowing media there to broadcast it. Media presented under the control by the host and has to subject to scrutiny of their recordings where it then checked and fast explained it. But all these are irrelevant to the core issue.

Too many within the media are too eager to portray a Putin in desperation
for losing the Ukraine War as well as not supported by other powers.

On Friday, September 23, 2022 at 3:22:25 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:

> Too many within the media are too eager to portray a Putin in desperation
> for losing the Ukraine War as well as not supported by other powers.

Yes, media are too keen to give a dig at Putin. In the article, it even smeared, that Putin is used to lateness for meetings, and used his power trips as a formed to keep others waiting on him.

BBC journalist Andrey Zakharaov wrote in Twitter:
"Putin, who has a history of power trips in the form of making foreign leaders wait for him (including Obama) - gets a taste of his own medicine".

And, thereafter, CNN journalist Bianna Golodryga retweeted Zakharaov and wrote: "What a montage."

These two reporters are so glaringly spending their time mocking at leaders.. Normally speaking, leaders arriving for meetings cannot be always be punctual the same arrival time but they can come forward to shake hands at the same time to shake hands to commence their presence in meeting.

The arrival porch and foyer is meant for one car arrival after another VVIP delegate at an expected arranged arrival time for each of them. Their accurate arrival time is depended on changes of scheduled routes or alternative routes from their hotel and also change of weather and unexpected traffic conditions, too.

In short, waiting for one another is a norm and is to be gesture of their gravitas to accept one or others as mature and respectful person to each other in leadership. On arrival, one after another, leaders will then moved to their assigned hall of rooms for their entourage.

Leader will take their rest in their room and may be refresh themselves in the rest room, refreshment and reading their speeches, too. Each side will have their own diplomatic coordinator to coordinate the timing of their leader to move out of their room to the stage of the main hall for their hand shake's meeting for the media photo-takings.

Each leader will wait for the other leader. A big power leader will be given the respect of arriving to the stage a few seconds behind to show the respective level of ranking accorded. This is how in big event of meetings with several leaders at the same time. Whatever their lateness will be taken up by each side.

Seriously, these two journalists or reporters, so to speak, are just plain rude, deliberately trifling on that unneeded disrespectful reporting.

One can be sure they have their own lateness in their daily appointments, too. Henceforth. these two journalists who are employed by their employer, BBC and CNN, to specifically paint Putin as bad disrespectful leader as much as possible with particular insulting comments in their tweeting and retweeting in order to tarnish and damage Putin's characters.

Therefore, these two journalists went to the big meeting with ulterior motives for them and for their employers, too. Their aims were to delight the world of tweeters to read on how they mocked at Putin's characters.

Henceforth, these two journalists should be banned by Russia and China and other countries from attending any of their future meetings. They should be banned by other leading countries from attending their meetings, too. Such rude journalists have no place to work in the journalist professions.

They have no professional standards to their journalistic standards of courtesy and respect to other. They have no respect to their own career ethics, too. Thus, they should be sanctioned and banned permanently from entering their countries whether personal or official visit.

Seriously, no employees should ever be allowed to cast smears and insults on leaders or even anyone by virtue of them holding a pen to write their duty of reporting. They should be sacked and permanently banned from any membership in international press membership required by foreign press meeting in individual country.