> Russia's Unfounded Claims of Secret U.S. Bioweapons Linger On and On
> By Steven Lee Myers, Sept. 4, 2022, NY Times
>
> Of the many falsehoods that the Kremlin has spread since the war in Ukraine
> began over six months ago, some of the most outlandish and yet enduring have
> been those accusing the U.S. of operating clandestine biological research
> programs

The NYT's lying (as usual). Russian officials (and non-officials)
long before the Ukraine case pointed to the facts. The Ukraine added
some new evidence to this topic.

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202010/1205140.shtml>
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1223843.shtml>
And Chinese were/are also concerned.

On Monday, September 5, 2022 at 7:19:59 PM UTC-4, Oleg Smirnov wrote:
> > Russia's Unfounded Claims of Secret U.S. Bioweapons Linger On and On
> > By Steven Lee Myers, Sept. 4, 2022, NY Times
> >
> > Of the many falsehoods that the Kremlin has spread since the war in Ukraine
> > began over six months ago, some of the most outlandish and yet enduring have
> > been those accusing the U.S. of operating clandestine biological research
> > programs
> The NYT's lying (as usual). Russian officials (and non-officials)
> long before the Ukraine case pointed to the facts. The Ukraine added
> some new evidence to this topic.
>
> <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202010/1205140.shtml>
> <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1223843.shtml>
> And Chinese were/are also concerned.

To be fair, the veracity of accusations on secret U.S. Bioweapons, as well hacking, and
being hacked is not average readers and posters to discussion groups can decide one
way or other. In general, domestic accusations carry more weight than foreign accusations.
And there had been accusations that the US government had outsourced such research
to foreign labs.

But then, the question is: Would US military outsource deadly bio-weapon research to other
nations? Of course not.

But this kind of thinking depends on one issue: When is a bio-weapon a bio-weapon?
Let me use an analogy to explain my point.

What if one seeks help in translating a book written in a foreign language but wants to keep
the content of the book in secret?
One simple solution: He cut up the book as much as possible. He then asked many people each
with a tiny portion of the book. He collects and put all the pieces in right places afterward
to learn the content of the book.

Of course, US bio-weapon research would similarly be done in foreign labs to
1) reduce the risk of deadly microbes escaping from US lab, and
2) strong denial. The end result from each foreign lab is not any
kind of bio-weapon.

On Monday, September 5, 2022 at 10:15:45 PM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
> On Monday, September 5, 2022 at 7:19:59 PM UTC-4, Oleg Smirnov wrote:
> > > Russia's Unfounded Claims of Secret U.S. Bioweapons Linger On and On
> > > By Steven Lee Myers, Sept. 4, 2022, NY Times
> > >
> > > Of the many falsehoods that the Kremlin has spread since the war in Ukraine
> > > began over six months ago, some of the most outlandish and yet enduring have
> > > been those accusing the U.S. of operating clandestine biological research
> > > programs
> > The NYT's lying (as usual). Russian officials (and non-officials)
> > long before the Ukraine case pointed to the facts. The Ukraine added
> > some new evidence to this topic.
> >
> > <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202010/1205140.shtml>
> > <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1223843.shtml>
> > And Chinese were/are also concerned.
> To be fair, the veracity of accusations on secret U.S. Bioweapons, as well hacking, and
> being hacked is not average readers and posters to discussion groups can decide one
> way or other. In general, domestic accusations carry more weight than foreign accusations.
> And there had been accusations that the US government had outsourced such research
> to foreign labs.
>
> But then, the question is: Would US military outsource deadly bio-weapon research to other
> nations? Of course not.
>
> But this kind of thinking depends on one issue: When is a bio-weapon a bio-weapon?

Should be "When is bio-weapon research bio-weapon research?"
> Let me use an analogy to explain my point.
>
> What if one seeks help in translating a book written in a foreign language but wants to keep
> the content of the book in secret?
> One simple solution: He cut up the book as much as possible. He then asked many people each
> with a tiny portion of the book. He collects and put all the pieces in right places afterward
> to learn the content of the book.
>
> Of course, US bio-weapon research would similarly be done in foreign labs to
> 1) reduce the risk of deadly microbes escaping from US lab, and
> 2) strong denial. The end result from each foreign lab is not any
> kind of bio-weapon.

ltlee1, <news:0b975966-445c-4c77-a90e-acd7d5c5c6acn@googlegroups.com>
> On Monday, September 5, 2022 at 7:19:59 PM UTC-4, Oleg Smirnov wrote:

>>> Russia's Unfounded Claims of Secret U.S. Bioweapons Linger On and On
>>> By Steven Lee Myers, Sept. 4, 2022, NY Times
>>>
>>> Of the many falsehoods that the Kremlin has spread since the war in
>>> Ukraine began over six months ago, some of the most outlandish and
>>> yet enduring have been those accusing the U.S. of operating
>>> clandestine biological research programs
>>
>> The NYT's lying (as usual). Russian officials (and non-officials)
>> long before the Ukraine case pointed to the facts. The Ukraine added
>> some new evidence to this topic.
>>
>> <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202010/1205140.shtml>
>> <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1223843.shtml>
>> And Chinese were/are also concerned.
>
> To be fair, the veracity of accusations on secret U.S. Bioweapons, as well
> hacking, and being hacked is not average readers and posters to discussion
> groups can decide one way or other. In general, domestic accusations
> carry more weight than foreign accusations.
> And there had been accusations that the US government had outsourced such
> research to foreign labs.
>
> But then, the question is: Would US military outsource deadly bio-weapon
> research to other nations? Of course not.
>
> But this kind of thinking depends on one issue: When is a bio-weapon a
> bio-weapon? Let me use an analogy to explain my point.
>
> What if one seeks help in translating a book written in a foreign language
> but wants to keep the content of the book in secret?
> One simple solution: He cut up the book as much as possible. He then asked
> many people each with a tiny portion of the book. He collects and put all
> the pieces in right places afterward to learn the content of the book.
>
> Of course, US bio-weapon research would similarly be done in foreign labs
> to
> 1) reduce the risk of deadly microbes escaping from US lab, and
> 2) strong denial. The end result from each foreign lab is not any
> kind of bio-weapon.

I agree with your considerations, they seem well relevant.

And, just the very fact these American extra-territorial bio-labs are
numerous, their operations are obscure, and it's funded, at least in
part, and supervised by the US DoD, gives a valid reason for concerns.

If the Americans claim it's solely for humanitarian / medical needs,
then why not invite qualified representatives from concerned countries
to take part in and / or observe these researches. In 2000s, American
representatives were more direct about these labs, they plainly said
it's linked with bio-weapons, but as a development of defense against
bio-weapons. However, development of a defense against a weapon often
implies the developers somehow deal with the very weapon, so there's
no clear distinction between development of a weapon and development
of a defense against the weapon.

On Russia part, an issue is that among the commentators that are many
in Russia, some tend to make too certain claims, including some silly
claims that are easy to refute and ridicule. It gives a pretext to the
American propaganda to claim that "the Russian propaganda" promotes
conspiracy theories. However the fact that some people make inaccurate
claims does not alleviate legitimate concerns about real purpose of
these untransparent bioresearch facilities (in close to Russia areas).

And such concerns were expressed since the 2000s, i.e. long before the
time when the Ukraine case became a hot topic, while the NYT's article
misrepresents it so as if it has spread since recently.

On Tuesday, September 6, 2022 at 4:24:47 PM UTC, Oleg Smirnov wrote:
> ltlee1, <news:0b975966-445c-4c77...@googlegroups.com>
> > On Monday, September 5, 2022 at 7:19:59 PM UTC-4, Oleg Smirnov wrote:
>
> >>> Russia's Unfounded Claims of Secret U.S. Bioweapons Linger On and On
> >>> By Steven Lee Myers, Sept. 4, 2022, NY Times
> >>>
> >>> Of the many falsehoods that the Kremlin has spread since the war in
> >>> Ukraine began over six months ago, some of the most outlandish and
> >>> yet enduring have been those accusing the U.S. of operating
> >>> clandestine biological research programs
> >>
> >> The NYT's lying (as usual). Russian officials (and non-officials)
> >> long before the Ukraine case pointed to the facts. The Ukraine added
> >> some new evidence to this topic.
> >>
> >> <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202010/1205140.shtml>
> >> <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1223843.shtml>
> >> And Chinese were/are also concerned.
> >
> > To be fair, the veracity of accusations on secret U.S. Bioweapons, as well
> > hacking, and being hacked is not average readers and posters to discussion
> > groups can decide one way or other. In general, domestic accusations
> > carry more weight than foreign accusations.
> > And there had been accusations that the US government had outsourced such
> > research to foreign labs.
> >
> > But then, the question is: Would US military outsource deadly bio-weapon
> > research to other nations? Of course not.
> >
> > But this kind of thinking depends on one issue: When is a bio-weapon a
> > bio-weapon? Let me use an analogy to explain my point.
> >
> > What if one seeks help in translating a book written in a foreign language
> > but wants to keep the content of the book in secret?
> > One simple solution: He cut up the book as much as possible. He then asked
> > many people each with a tiny portion of the book. He collects and put all
> > the pieces in right places afterward to learn the content of the book.
> >
> > Of course, US bio-weapon research would similarly be done in foreign labs
> > to
> > 1) reduce the risk of deadly microbes escaping from US lab, and
> > 2) strong denial. The end result from each foreign lab is not any
> > kind of bio-weapon.
> I agree with your considerations, they seem well relevant.
>
> And, just the very fact these American extra-territorial bio-labs are
> numerous, their operations are obscure, and it's funded, at least in
> part, and supervised by the US DoD, gives a valid reason for concerns.
>
> If the Americans claim it's solely for humanitarian / medical needs,
> then why not invite qualified representatives from concerned countries
> to take part in and / or observe these researches. In 2000s, American
> representatives were more direct about these labs, they plainly said
> it's linked with bio-weapons, but as a development of defense against
> bio-weapons. However, development of a defense against a weapon often
> implies the developers somehow deal with the very weapon, so there's
> no clear distinction between development of a weapon and development
> of a defense against the weapon.
>
> On Russia part, an issue is that among the commentators that are many
> in Russia, some tend to make too certain claims, including some silly
> claims that are easy to refute and ridicule. It gives a pretext to the
> American propaganda to claim that "the Russian propaganda" promotes
> conspiracy theories. However the fact that some people make inaccurate
> claims does not alleviate legitimate concerns about real purpose of
> these untransparent bioresearch facilities (in close to Russia areas).
>
> And such concerns were expressed since the 2000s, i.e. long before the
> time when the Ukraine case became a hot topic, while the NYT's article
> misrepresents it so as if it has spread since recently.

The UN could rightfully play a role in determining when is bio-weapon research
bio-weapon research. And to what degree dual use research could exported.
Bioweapon is worse than nuclear weapon.